<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2026-2076</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2026-04-25</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2026-04-25</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2026-04-25</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2026-04-25</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">kernel security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().

syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk
in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]

syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before
the TFO socket completes 3WHS:

  1. accept()
  2. connect(AF_UNSPEC)
  3. connect() to another destination

As of accept(), sk-&gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes
it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.

Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk, the
retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not
retransmitted.

Let&apos;s call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))
Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e
RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400
RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8
R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540
R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738)
 call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747)
 __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372)
 timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135)
 tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035)
 __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1))
 tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096)
 handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580)
 irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696)
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35))
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;(CVE-2025-39955)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/64s/slb: Fix SLB multihit issue during SLB preload

On systems using the hash MMU, there is a software SLB preload cache that
mirrors the entries loaded into the hardware SLB buffer. This preload
cache is subject to periodic eviction — typically after every 256 context
switches — to remove old entry.

To optimize performance, the kernel skips switch_mmu_context() in
switch_mm_irqs_off() when the prev and next mm_struct are the same.
However, on hash MMU systems, this can lead to inconsistencies between
the hardware SLB and the software preload cache.

If an SLB entry for a process is evicted from the software cache on one
CPU, and the same process later runs on another CPU without executing
switch_mmu_context(), the hardware SLB may retain stale entries. If the
kernel then attempts to reload that entry, it can trigger an SLB
multi-hit error.

The following timeline shows how stale SLB entries are created and can
cause a multi-hit error when a process moves between CPUs without a
MMU context switch.

CPU 0                                   CPU 1
-----                                    -----
Process P
exec                                    swapper/1
 load_elf_binary
  begin_new_exc
    activate_mm
     switch_mm_irqs_off
      switch_mmu_context
       switch_slb
       /*
        * This invalidates all
        * the entries in the HW
        * and setup the new HW
        * SLB entries as per the
        * preload cache.
        */
context_switch
sched_migrate_task migrates process P to cpu-1

Process swapper/0                       context switch (to process P)
(uses mm_struct of Process P)           switch_mm_irqs_off()
                                         switch_slb
                                           load_slb++
                                            /*
                                            * load_slb becomes 0 here
                                            * and we evict an entry from
                                            * the preload cache with
                                            * preload_age(). We still
                                            * keep HW SLB and preload
                                            * cache in sync, that is
                                            * because all HW SLB entries
                                            * anyways gets evicted in
                                            * switch_slb during SLBIA.
                                            * We then only add those
                                            * entries back in HW SLB,
                                            * which are currently
                                            * present in preload_cache
                                            * (after eviction).
                                            */
                                        load_elf_binary continues...
                                         setup_new_exec()
                                          slb_setup_new_exec()

                                        sched_switch event
                                        sched_migrate_task migrates
                                        process P to cpu-0

context_switch from swapper/0 to Process P
 switch_mm_irqs_off()
  /*
   * Since both prev and next mm struct are same we don&apos;t call
   * switch_mmu_context(). This will cause the HW SLB and SW preload
   * cache to go out of sync in preload_new_slb_context. Because there
   * was an SLB entry which was evicted from both HW and preload cache
   * on cpu-1. Now later in preload_new_slb_context(), when we will try
   * to add the same preload entry again, we will add this to the SW
   * preload cache and then will add it to the HW SLB. Since on cpu-0
   * this entry was never invalidated, hence adding this entry to the HW
   * SLB will cause a SLB multi-hit error.
   */
load_elf_binary cont
---truncated---(CVE-2025-71078)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: fix use-after-free due to enslave fail after slave array update

Fix a use-after-free which happens due to enslave failure after the new
slave has been added to the array. Since the new slave can be used for Tx
immediately, we can use it after it has been freed by the enslave error
cleanup path which frees the allocated slave memory. Slave update array is
supposed to be called last when further enslave failures are not expected.
Move it after xdp setup to avoid any problems.

It is very easy to reproduce the problem with a simple xdp_pass prog:
 ip l add bond1 type bond mode balance-xor
 ip l set bond1 up
 ip l set dev bond1 xdp object xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass
 ip l add dumdum type dummy

Then run in parallel:
 while :; do ip l set dumdum master bond1 1&gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; done;
 mausezahn bond1 -a own -b rand -A rand -B 1.1.1.1 -c 0 -t tcp &quot;dp=1-1023, flags=syn&quot;

The crash happens almost immediately:
 [  605.602850] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0e6fc2460000137: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 [  605.602916] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x07380123000009b8-0x07380123000009bf]
 [  605.602946] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2445 Comm: mausezahn Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B               6.19.0-rc6+ #21 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 [  605.602979] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
 [  605.602998] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 [  605.603032] RIP: 0010:netdev_core_pick_tx+0xcd/0x210
 [  605.603063] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 3e 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 6b 08 49 8d 7d 30 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 02 00 0f 85 25 01 00 00 49 8b 45 30 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89
 [  605.603111] RSP: 0018:ffff88817b9af348 EFLAGS: 00010213
 [  605.603145] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88817d28b420 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [  605.603172] RDX: 00e7002460000137 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 07380123000009be
 [  605.603199] RBP: ffff88817b541a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff3ed8c0c
 [  605.603226] R10: ffffffff9f6c6067 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
 [  605.603253] R13: 073801230000098e R14: ffff88817d28b448 R15: ffff88817b541a84
 [  605.603286] FS:  00007f6570ef67c0(0000) GS:ffff888221dfa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [  605.603319] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [  605.603343] CR2: 00007f65712fae40 CR3: 000000011371b000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 [  605.603373] Call Trace:
 [  605.603392]  &lt;TASK&gt;
 [  605.603410]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x448/0x32a0
 [  605.603434]  ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603461]  ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603484]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603507]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603546]  ? _printk+0xcb/0x100
 [  605.603566]  ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603589]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603627]  ? add_taint+0x5e/0x70
 [  605.603648]  ? add_taint+0x2a/0x70
 [  605.603670]  ? end_report.cold+0x51/0x75
 [  605.603693]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603731]  bond_start_xmit+0x623/0xc20 [bonding](CVE-2026-23171)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()

Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].

smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path
(softirq) via icsk_af_ops-&gt;syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP
listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock
pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed
concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock-&gt;sk_user_data
to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself
can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().

This leads to two issues:

1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when
   accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the
   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,
   ori_af_ops) are accessed.

The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]
triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -&gt;
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path
has the same race):

  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)

  tcp_v4_rcv()
    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
    sk = req-&gt;rsk_listener
    sock_hold(sk)
    /* No lock on listener */
                               smc_close_active():
                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 sk_user_data = NULL
                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 ...
                                 smc_clcsock_release()
                                 sock_put(smc-&gt;sk) x2
                                   -&gt; smc_sock freed!
    tcp_check_req()
      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
        smc = user_data(sk)
          -&gt; NULL or dangling
        smc-&gt;queued_smc_hs
          -&gt; crash!

Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects
with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the
clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the
smc_sock from being freed.

Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely
access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in
the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on
sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN
flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.

- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that
  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace
  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when
  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&amp;smc-&gt;sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the
  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close
  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.

Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of
sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for
NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing
any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.

Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,
the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9(CVE-2026-23450)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option. Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with wrong credentials. It turned out the client was reusing SMB session from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a different username= option had been specified to the other mounts. By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since cifs-utils-4.8. So fix this by matching username mount option in match_session() even with Kerberos.(CVE-2026-31392)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: EC: clean up handlers on probe failure in acpi_ec_setup()

When ec_install_handlers() returns -EPROBE_DEFER on reduced-hardware
platforms, it has already started the EC and installed the address
space handler with the struct acpi_ec pointer as handler context.
However, acpi_ec_setup() propagates the error without any cleanup.

The caller acpi_ec_add() then frees the struct acpi_ec for non-boot
instances, leaving a dangling handler context in ACPICA.

Any subsequent AML evaluation that accesses an EC OpRegion field
dispatches into acpi_ec_space_handler() with the freed pointer,
causing a use-after-free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800721de38 by task init/1
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
  acpi_ec_space_handler (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1362)
  acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch (drivers/acpi/acpica/evregion.c:293)
  acpi_ex_access_region (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:246)
  acpi_ex_field_datum_io (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:509)
  acpi_ex_extract_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:700)
  acpi_ex_read_data_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfield.c:327)
  acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value (drivers/acpi/acpica/exresolv.c:392)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 1:
  acpi_ec_alloc (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1424)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1692)

 Freed by task 1:
  kfree (mm/slub.c:6876)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1751)

The bug triggers on reduced-hardware EC platforms (ec-&gt;gpe &lt; 0)
when the GPIO IRQ provider defers probing. Once the stale handler
exists, any unprivileged sysfs read that causes AML to touch an
EC OpRegion (battery, thermal, backlight) exercises the dangling
pointer.

Fix this by calling ec_remove_handlers() in the error path of
acpi_ec_setup() before clearing first_ec. ec_remove_handlers()
checks each EC_FLAGS_* bit before acting, so it is safe to call
regardless of how far ec_install_handlers() progressed:

  -ENODEV  (handler not installed): only calls acpi_ec_stop()
  -EPROBE_DEFER (handler installed): removes handler, stops EC(CVE-2026-31426)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of high. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">High</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">kernel</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-39955</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2025-71078</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23171</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-23450</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31392</URL>
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-31426</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39955</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71078</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23171</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23450</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31392</URL>
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31426</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
	<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
		<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
			<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">bpftool-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-headers-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-source-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">python3-perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.src.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">bpftool-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">bpftool-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-debugsource-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-headers-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-headers-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-source-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-source-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">kernel-tools-devel-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">python3-perf-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">python3-perf-debuginfo-5.10.0-310.0.0.213.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
	</ProductTree>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect().

syzbot reported the splat below where a socket had tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk
in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state. [0]

syzbot reused the server-side TCP Fast Open socket as a new client before
the TFO socket completes 3WHS:

  1. accept()
  2. connect(AF_UNSPEC)
  3. connect() to another destination

As of accept(), sk-&gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_RECV, and tcp_disconnect() changes
it to TCP_CLOSE and makes connect() possible, which restarts timers.

Since tcp_disconnect() forgot to clear tcp_sk(sk)-&gt;fastopen_rsk, the
retransmit timer triggered the warning and the intended packet was not
retransmitted.

Let&apos;s call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_disconnect().

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-g201825fb4278 #62 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tcp_retransmit_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:542 (discriminator 7))
Code: 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 8b af b8 08 00 00 48 89 fb 48 85 ed 0f 84 55 01 00 00 0f b6 47 12 3c 03 74 0c 0f b6 47 12 3c 04 74 04 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 90 48 8b 85 c0 00 00 00 48 89 ef 48 8b 40 30 e8 6a 4f 06 3e
RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f8d40 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888106911400 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: 0000000002517619 RSI: ffffffff83764080 RDI: ffff888106911400
RBP: ffff888106d5c000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffc900002f8de8
R10: 00000000000000c2 R11: ffffc900002f8ff8 R12: ffff888106911540
R13: ffff888106911480 R14: ffff888106911840 R15: ffffc900002f8de0
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88907b768000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8044d69d90 CR3: 0000000002c30003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 tcp_write_timer (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:738)
 call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1747)
 __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2372)
 timer_expire_remote (kernel/time/timer.c:2385 kernel/time/timer.c:2376 kernel/time/timer.c:2135)
 tmigr_handle_remote_up (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:944 kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1035)
 __walk_groups.isra.0 (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:533 (discriminator 1))
 tmigr_handle_remote (kernel/time/timer_migration.c:1096)
 handle_softirqs (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:580)
 irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:614 kernel/softirq.c:453 kernel/softirq.c:680 kernel/softirq.c:696)
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35) arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1050 (discriminator 35))
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-39955</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="2" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/64s/slb: Fix SLB multihit issue during SLB preload

On systems using the hash MMU, there is a software SLB preload cache that
mirrors the entries loaded into the hardware SLB buffer. This preload
cache is subject to periodic eviction — typically after every 256 context
switches — to remove old entry.

To optimize performance, the kernel skips switch_mmu_context() in
switch_mm_irqs_off() when the prev and next mm_struct are the same.
However, on hash MMU systems, this can lead to inconsistencies between
the hardware SLB and the software preload cache.

If an SLB entry for a process is evicted from the software cache on one
CPU, and the same process later runs on another CPU without executing
switch_mmu_context(), the hardware SLB may retain stale entries. If the
kernel then attempts to reload that entry, it can trigger an SLB
multi-hit error.

The following timeline shows how stale SLB entries are created and can
cause a multi-hit error when a process moves between CPUs without a
MMU context switch.

CPU 0                                   CPU 1
-----                                    -----
Process P
exec                                    swapper/1
 load_elf_binary
  begin_new_exc
    activate_mm
     switch_mm_irqs_off
      switch_mmu_context
       switch_slb
       /*
        * This invalidates all
        * the entries in the HW
        * and setup the new HW
        * SLB entries as per the
        * preload cache.
        */
context_switch
sched_migrate_task migrates process P to cpu-1

Process swapper/0                       context switch (to process P)
(uses mm_struct of Process P)           switch_mm_irqs_off()
                                         switch_slb
                                           load_slb++
                                            /*
                                            * load_slb becomes 0 here
                                            * and we evict an entry from
                                            * the preload cache with
                                            * preload_age(). We still
                                            * keep HW SLB and preload
                                            * cache in sync, that is
                                            * because all HW SLB entries
                                            * anyways gets evicted in
                                            * switch_slb during SLBIA.
                                            * We then only add those
                                            * entries back in HW SLB,
                                            * which are currently
                                            * present in preload_cache
                                            * (after eviction).
                                            */
                                        load_elf_binary continues...
                                         setup_new_exec()
                                          slb_setup_new_exec()

                                        sched_switch event
                                        sched_migrate_task migrates
                                        process P to cpu-0

context_switch from swapper/0 to Process P
 switch_mm_irqs_off()
  /*
   * Since both prev and next mm struct are same we don&apos;t call
   * switch_mmu_context(). This will cause the HW SLB and SW preload
   * cache to go out of sync in preload_new_slb_context. Because there
   * was an SLB entry which was evicted from both HW and preload cache
   * on cpu-1. Now later in preload_new_slb_context(), when we will try
   * to add the same preload entry again, we will add this to the SW
   * preload cache and then will add it to the HW SLB. Since on cpu-0
   * this entry was never invalidated, hence adding this entry to the HW
   * SLB will cause a SLB multi-hit error.
   */
load_elf_binary cont
---truncated---</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2025-71078</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="3" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: fix use-after-free due to enslave fail after slave array update

Fix a use-after-free which happens due to enslave failure after the new
slave has been added to the array. Since the new slave can be used for Tx
immediately, we can use it after it has been freed by the enslave error
cleanup path which frees the allocated slave memory. Slave update array is
supposed to be called last when further enslave failures are not expected.
Move it after xdp setup to avoid any problems.

It is very easy to reproduce the problem with a simple xdp_pass prog:
 ip l add bond1 type bond mode balance-xor
 ip l set bond1 up
 ip l set dev bond1 xdp object xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass
 ip l add dumdum type dummy

Then run in parallel:
 while :; do ip l set dumdum master bond1 1&gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1; done;
 mausezahn bond1 -a own -b rand -A rand -B 1.1.1.1 -c 0 -t tcp &quot;dp=1-1023, flags=syn&quot;

The crash happens almost immediately:
 [  605.602850] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0e6fc2460000137: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 [  605.602916] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x07380123000009b8-0x07380123000009bf]
 [  605.602946] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2445 Comm: mausezahn Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B               6.19.0-rc6+ #21 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 [  605.602979] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
 [  605.602998] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 [  605.603032] RIP: 0010:netdev_core_pick_tx+0xcd/0x210
 [  605.603063] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 3e 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 6b 08 49 8d 7d 30 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 02 00 0f 85 25 01 00 00 49 8b 45 30 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89
 [  605.603111] RSP: 0018:ffff88817b9af348 EFLAGS: 00010213
 [  605.603145] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88817d28b420 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [  605.603172] RDX: 00e7002460000137 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 07380123000009be
 [  605.603199] RBP: ffff88817b541a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff3ed8c0c
 [  605.603226] R10: ffffffff9f6c6067 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
 [  605.603253] R13: 073801230000098e R14: ffff88817d28b448 R15: ffff88817b541a84
 [  605.603286] FS:  00007f6570ef67c0(0000) GS:ffff888221dfa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [  605.603319] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [  605.603343] CR2: 00007f65712fae40 CR3: 000000011371b000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 [  605.603373] Call Trace:
 [  605.603392]  &lt;TASK&gt;
 [  605.603410]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x448/0x32a0
 [  605.603434]  ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603461]  ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603484]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603507]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603546]  ? _printk+0xcb/0x100
 [  605.603566]  ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
 [  605.603589]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603627]  ? add_taint+0x5e/0x70
 [  605.603648]  ? add_taint+0x2a/0x70
 [  605.603670]  ? end_report.cold+0x51/0x75
 [  605.603693]  ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding]
 [  605.603731]  bond_start_xmit+0x623/0xc20 [bonding]</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23171</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>High</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>7.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="4" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()

Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].

smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path
(softirq) via icsk_af_ops-&gt;syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP
listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock
pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed
concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock-&gt;sk_user_data
to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself
can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().

This leads to two issues:

1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when
   accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the
   smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs,
   ori_af_ops) are accessed.

The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1]
triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -&gt;
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path
has the same race):

  CPU A (softirq)              CPU B (process ctx)

  tcp_v4_rcv()
    TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
    sk = req-&gt;rsk_listener
    sock_hold(sk)
    /* No lock on listener */
                               smc_close_active():
                                 write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 sk_user_data = NULL
                                 write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
                                 ...
                                 smc_clcsock_release()
                                 sock_put(smc-&gt;sk) x2
                                   -&gt; smc_sock freed!
    tcp_check_req()
      smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
        smc = user_data(sk)
          -&gt; NULL or dangling
        smc-&gt;queued_smc_hs
          -&gt; crash!

Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects
with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the
clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the
smc_sock from being freed.

Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely
access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in
the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on
sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN
flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.

- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that
  smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace
  period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when
  accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&amp;smc-&gt;sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the
  smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close
  path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.

Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of
sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for
NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing
any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.

Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run,
the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-23450</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>6.4</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="5" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option. Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with wrong credentials. It turned out the client was reusing SMB session from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a different username= option had been specified to the other mounts. By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since cifs-utils-4.8. So fix this by matching username mount option in match_session() even with Kerberos.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31392</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="6" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: EC: clean up handlers on probe failure in acpi_ec_setup()

When ec_install_handlers() returns -EPROBE_DEFER on reduced-hardware
platforms, it has already started the EC and installed the address
space handler with the struct acpi_ec pointer as handler context.
However, acpi_ec_setup() propagates the error without any cleanup.

The caller acpi_ec_add() then frees the struct acpi_ec for non-boot
instances, leaving a dangling handler context in ACPICA.

Any subsequent AML evaluation that accesses an EC OpRegion field
dispatches into acpi_ec_space_handler() with the freed pointer,
causing a use-after-free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800721de38 by task init/1
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:289)
  acpi_ec_space_handler (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1362)
  acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch (drivers/acpi/acpica/evregion.c:293)
  acpi_ex_access_region (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:246)
  acpi_ex_field_datum_io (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:509)
  acpi_ex_extract_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfldio.c:700)
  acpi_ex_read_data_from_field (drivers/acpi/acpica/exfield.c:327)
  acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value (drivers/acpi/acpica/exresolv.c:392)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

 Allocated by task 1:
  acpi_ec_alloc (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1424)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1692)

 Freed by task 1:
  kfree (mm/slub.c:6876)
  acpi_ec_add (drivers/acpi/ec.c:1751)

The bug triggers on reduced-hardware EC platforms (ec-&gt;gpe &lt; 0)
when the GPIO IRQ provider defers probing. Once the stale handler
exists, any unprivileged sysfs read that causes AML to touch an
EC OpRegion (battery, thermal, backlight) exercises the dangling
pointer.

Fix this by calling ec_remove_handlers() in the error path of
acpi_ec_setup() before clearing first_ec. ec_remove_handlers()
checks each EC_FLAGS_* bit before acting, so it is safe to call
regardless of how far ec_install_handlers() progressed:

  -ENODEV  (handler not installed): only calls acpi_ec_stop()
  -EPROBE_DEFER (handler installed): removes handler, stops EC</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-04-25</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-31426</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Medium</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>5.8</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>kernel security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-04-25</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2076</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>